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Abstract
This paper uses data collected from eBay’s website to identify why buyers fail to
leave (negative) feedback in online markets. Empirical results confirm that the fear of
retaliation may be an important motivation for buyers not to leave (negative) feedback,
while the time and effort cost of reporting may be not.
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Introduction
Reputation systems rely on voluntary feedback from traders to reduce information asym-
metry and sustain trust, especially in online markets. Understanding participants’ feedback
behaviors helps improve reputation systems and sheds light on a broad range of observed
behaviors (e.g., teaching evaluations, recommendation letters, and referee reports.)
Several authors find that buyers on eBay leave feedback about half the time. Moreover,
in eBay’s bi-lateral feedback system where both buyers and sellers can leave feedback after
transactions, negative feedback is less frequent than positive feedback . Dellarocas and Wood
(Forthcoming) and Klein et al. (2005) suggest fear of retaliation against the buyer who leave
negative feedback may be a reason for missing negative feedback. Thus, buyers’ concern
about their own reputations keep them silent even if they are willing to spend time and
∗Tel.: 502-852-2342; fax: 502-852-7672. e-mail: ivy.li@louisville.edu.
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effort on reporting their poorly performing counter parties. Another explanation of the lack
of feedback may be the time/effort nuisance cost: feedback is a public good (not previously
tested empirically.) For example, the participation rate in teaching evaluations drops after
changing from in-class paper evaluations to online.
In experimental economics, Fehr and Gchter (2000) and Nikiforakisy (2007) find that
people are willing to bear costs to punish deviators, but are less likely to punish when
counter-punishment is possible. If buyers’ feedback-leaving behaviors are consistent with the
lab findings, we will see that buyers are willing to bear the nuisance cost of leaving negative
feedback (i.e., cost to punish deviators), but are less likely to leave negative feedback when
facing retaliation from strategic sellers (i.e., counter punishment.)
First, by examining both nuisance cost and fear of retaliation concerns in bi-lateral
systems, this paper adds to previous research by directly addressing the question of why
people do not leave feedback. Second, instead of using a lab experiment, I compile a unique
data set using eBay’s 2003 policy change to identify whether nuisance cost is a consideration
for buyers’ decision to leave feedback.1 Third, I develop a novel model to analyze traders’
decisions dealing with the issues that arise when actual quality of products/services are not
observable.
The empirical results suggest that although fear of retaliations may be an important
motivation for buyers’ reluctance to leave feedback, time and effort costs of reporting may
be not important. Thus, further research on reducing nuisance costs may be a less fruitful
approach to improving feedback mechanism design. These findings are relatively consistent
with punishment and counter-punishment behavior in lab experiments.
1 In 2003, eBay introduced an additional page that members with feedback scores ≤ 10 must read
prior to leaving neutral or negative feedback. On average, it takes 5 or 6 minutes to complete it. See
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tutorial/feedbacktutorial/js tutorial.html
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Data
The data set contains information on 6609 successful eBay transactions for the iPod Nano
MP3 player during September 1-30, 2006.2 The data contains auction information, general
information about seller and buyer information, and feedback information of each transac-
tion. Figure 1 shows the summary of all feedback behavior and timing. The percentage
represents the proportion of transactions in each feedback timing pattern. The number be-
low the percentage represents the number of transactions in each pattern. Among the 116
Figure 1: Feedback Decision Tree with Data
cases where buyers left negative feedback, 73 were left by experienced buyer and 43 by inex-
perienced buyers.3 Figure 1 appears to suggests that buyers are concerned about retaliation
and the extra time cost, which may deter buyers from leaving negative feedback.
2IPod Nano was in the 3rd most popular items on eBay during this period.
3 On eBay, traders can also leave neutral feedback. Researchers usually consider neutral feedback equal
to negative feedback (Cabral and Hortac¸su (2006); Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002)). To be consistent with
eBay’s education site policy, I define members with feedback scores ≤ 10 as “inexperienced,” “experienced”
otherwise.
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Analytical Framework
To identify whether nuisance costs and fears of retaliation are reasons for buyers not to
report, we test:
(1) Are buyers more likely to remain silent if sellers do not report first?
(2) Are inexperienced buyers more likely to remain silent than experienced buyers?
(3) If sellers do not report first, are buyers more likely to be silent when receiving low quality
products/services versus high quality ones?
(4) Are inexperienced buyers more likely to remain silent than experienced buyers when
receiving low quality products/service versus high quality ones?
To capture unobserved binary transaction outcomes, I build an empirical model that
captures the sequence of events: transaction outcomes are selected by sellers first, then buyers
choose whether to leave feedback. I use maximum likelihood method to simultaneously
estimate the two equations in the model. The following binary choice model represents a
buyer’s decision to leave feedback:
Yi =
 1 (No Report), if Y
∗
i > 0
0 (Report), otherwise
where the latent variable, Y ∗i , represents a buyer’s indirect utility from remaining silent. It
is estimated by:
Y ∗i = β0 +X
′
1iβ1 + β2X2i + β3D3i + β4D3iX2i + β5D5i + β6D5iX2i + εi (1)
where X1i is a vector of buyer characteristics and auction information, including age on eBay,
reputation score, positive feedback percentage, number of negative feedback received, price,
number of bids, duration of the auction. X2i is an index of unobserved transaction quality,
either high quality (HQ) or low quality (LQ). If a buyer is satisfied with the seller, then the
transaction is HQ and X2i = 1, otherwise it is LQ and X2i = 0. D3i is a dummy variable
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representing whether a buyer is inexperienced or not. If a buyer’s reputation score is ≤ 10,
he is an inexperienced trader, with D3i = 1. D5i is a dummy variable indicating whether a
seller has left feedback. If a seller does not report first, D5i = 1.
The latent value of the true binary transaction outcome index, X2i, is estimated from
seller characteristics:
X2i =
 1 (HQ), if X
∗
2i > 0
0 (LQ), otherwise
where the latent value of X2i is estimated by the following equation:
X∗2i = Z
′
iα + ηi. (2)
Zi is a vector of a constant along with characteristics of the seller, including age and histor-
ical feedback profile.
I estimate the coefficients using maximum likelihood method with the likelihood function
L(Y ; θ) =
∏
Yi=1
Pr(Yi = 1)
∏
Yi=0
[1− Pr(Yi = 1)] (3)
where
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(X2i = 1)Pr(Yi = 1|X2i = 1) + Pr(X2i = 0)Pr(Yi = 1|X2i = 0)
= Pr(X∗2i ≥ 0)Pr(Y ∗i ≥ 1|X2i = 1) + [1− Pr(X∗2i ≥ 0)]Pr(Y ∗i ≥ 1|X2i = 0).
The marginal probability for a buyer to remain silent is the product of the probability
“to report” conditional on the transaction outcome and the probability of the transaction
outcome. Then, we calculate the conditional probability given the transaction outcome is
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LQ or HQ. When the transaction outcome is LQ,
Y ∗i |X2i=0 = β0 + β3D3i + β5D5i +X ′1iβ1 + εi (4)
and when the transaction outcome is HQ,
Y ∗i |X2i=1 = (β0 + β2) + (β3 + β4)D3i + (β5 + β6)D5i +X ′1iβ1 + εi (5)
= δ0 + δ1D3i + δ2D5i +X
′
1iβ1 + εi (6)
I assume the error terms, ²i and ηi, are independent and follow logistic distributions with
F (z) = 1/(1 + e−z).4 Thus,
Pr(Yi = 1|X2i = 1) = F (δ0 + δ1D3i + δ2D5i +X ′1iβ1), (7)
Pr(Yi = 1|X2i = 0) = F (β0 +X ′1iβ1 + β3D3i + β5D5i), (8)
and
Pr(X2i = 1) = F (Z
′
iα). (9)
Thus, the marginal probability for a buyer to report equals
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(X2i = 1)Pr(Yi = 1|X2i = 1) + Pr(X2i = 0)Pr(Yi = 1|X2i = 0)
= F (Z ′iα)F (δ0 + δ1D3i + δ2D5i +X
′
1iβ1) (10)
+ [1− F (Z ′iα)]F (β0 +X ′1iβ1 + β3D3i + β5D5i).
I substitute (10) into (3) and estimate all parameters. Using this empirical model, even
though we do not observe the actual transactions qualities, we are still able to estimate the
4I make this assumption since we cannot observe actual transaction qualities.
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parameters of interests. Finally, βˆ4 = δˆ1 − βˆ3 is
(an inexperienced buyer’s propensity to be silent− an experienced buyer’s|HQ)
−(an inexperienced buyer’s propensity to be silent− an experienced buyer’s |LQ), (11)
and βˆ6 = δˆ2 − βˆ5 is
(a buyer’s propensity to be silent when the seller does not report first
−his propensity to be silent when the seller reports first|HQ)
−(a buyer’s propensity to be silent when the seller does not report first
−his propensity to be silent when the seller reports first|LQ). (12)
Results
The results in Table 1 show βˆ3 is positive at the 1% level: inexperienced buyers are more likely
to keep silent than experienced buyers when transaction outcomes are LQ. βˆ4 is negative
but insignificant. βˆ5 is positive and significant at the 10% level: buyers are more likely to
remain silent when sellers do not report first. The effect on buyers’ propensity to remain
silent when sellers report first is lower for HQ transactions than LQ ones, since βˆ6 is negative
at the 1% level.
Thus, the extra time and effort needed to leave negative feedback may be a concern for
inexperienced buyers reporting when the transaction outcomes are LQ. However, inexperi-
enced buyers may be more likely to keep silent than experienced buyers when the transaction
outcome is HQ. The difference-in-difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, the nui-
sance cost may not be a motivation for buyers failing to leave feedback. Moreover, when
sellers do not reports first, buyers are more likely to remain silent. The difference in buyers’
propensity to remain silent, given that sellers do not report, are higher when the outcome is
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HQ. This suggests that fear of retaliation discourages buyers reporting to a greater degree
when transaction outcomes are LQ than when transaction outcomes are HQ.
Conclusion
These findings on feedback behavior suggest that fears of retaliation may be a concern for
buyers. This provides empirical support for eBay’s May 2008 policy change to ban sellers
leaving negative feedback for buyers. This paper demonstrates that at least eBay’s attempt
to solve the fear of retaliation problem in the feedback system is a step in the right direction
(although the policy implication needs more detailed investigation.) More importantly, we
also show that nuisance costs may not be important. Both findings from real-world evidence
are consistent with lab experiments: traders are willing to bear costs to punish deviators
but are less likely to punish when counter-punishment is possible.
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Table 1: Estimation Results
Main Variables coeff. estimation (std.)
dummy to indicate inexperienced buyer (βˆ3) 0.7998 (0.0314)
∗∗∗
inexperienced buyer × indicator for high quality outcome (βˆ4) -0.1602 (0.1303)
dummy to indicate seller does not report first (βˆ5) 0.1051 (0.0547)
∗
seller does not report first × indicator for high quality outcome (βˆ6) -3.3144 (0.1510)∗∗∗
Control Variables
item price -0.0004 (0.0000)∗∗∗
auction duration (in minutes) -0.0001 (0.0000)∗∗∗
bid count 0.0074 (0.0027)∗∗∗
how long the buyer has been on eBay (days) 0.0000 (0.0000)
buyer’s feedback score -0.0012 (0.0005)∗∗
buyer’s all positive feedback 0.0007 (0.0003)∗∗∗
buyer’s unique negative feedback 0.0996 (0.0240)∗∗∗
buyer’s positive feedback percentage -0.0042 (0.0004)∗∗∗
seller’s positive feedback percentage -0.014 (21.144)
seller feedback score 0.213 (7.055)
seller’s all positive feedback 0.043 (1.440)
seller’s unique negative feedback 0.802 (27.169)
Note: ***, **, * represents significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. All numbers are saved up
to four digits after the decimal point.
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